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Abstract 
Using a representative sample of Italian workers aged 55 and above, we study their preference 
for anticipated retirement and their willingness to pay for a year of anticipation after the recent 
Italian pension reform (2011), which significantly restricted the access conditions to 
retirement. We distinguish workers by gender and according to whether they have been obliged 
to postpone their exit by the reform. The preference for anticipated retirement is particularly 
strong for women and for workers who were directly affected by the reform. As for the 
“willingness to pay” to anticipate retirement, there is no systematic difference between the two 
categories, and this finding is common to both men and women. We also investigate whether 
informal care duties play a role in explaining the willingness to pay, and we find that the effect 
differs across genders. Women who are involved in informal care of children are willing to pay 
significantly more than women who are not caregivers and more than men. Our findings 
suggest that retirement policies produce side effects, which differ according to both gender and 
being a caregiver or not. These effects signal that when a pension system performs further 
tasks than the provision of retirement income, its reform may cause social mismatches unless 
supplemented by appropriate changes in other social programmes. 
 
Keywords: Italian pension reform; willingness to anticipate retirement; gender bias; 
caregiving. 
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Introduction  
Retirement decisions have attracted much attention from researchers in recent years, in parallel with 
the pension reforms that, besides strengthening the financial sustainability of pension systems, have 
increased individual choices, risks and responsibility. Understanding workers’ reactions to changes in 
pension rules has important implications for the effectiveness of such policies (see Behaghel and Blau 
(2012) and Mastrobuoni (2009) regarding the 1983 US Social Security reform). 
In this paper we study the effects of the latest Italian pension reform, the so-called “Monti‒Fornero 
reform” (law 214/2011) of two aspects of (older) workers’ behaviour: their preference for anticipated 
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retirement and their readiness to pay for it. The Monti‒Fornero reform was introduced at the apex of 
the 2011 financial crisis and, because of the threatening circumstances, had an almost immediate 
effect, only allowing for a very short transition period, a feature that stands in sharp contrast to past 
reforms characterised by an excessively long phasing-in period4 (Fornero 2015). The reform 
introduced sharp restrictions on early retirement provisions (such as pure seniority pensions, formerly 
awarded almost irrespective of age) as well as more stringent “age plus seniority” requirements for 
normal (old age) retirement. It also equalised, as of 2018, the more generous requisites for women (in 
private employment) than for men and indexed all the requirements to longevity. Finally, it established 
the immediate application of the defined contribution formula for all future seniorities, irrespective of 
the distance to retirement. The rather drastic reduction of the pure seniority exit prevented early 
retirement and meant a forced delay in retirement for the majority of workers (from 1 to 7 years). 
Given the circumstances, it is fair to say that the Monti‒Fornero reform was a significant policy shock, 
which was largely unexpected in its intensity. 
Using a data set drawn from a representative sample of Italian workers aged 55 and above, we 
measure the willingness to anticipate retirement and the consequent willingness to pay for one year of 
anticipation. We focus on three elements: i) gender; ii) informal care activities provided by the 
prospective retirees; and iii) whether or not the worker was forced to postpone retirement by the 
reform.  
The literature on retirement decisions has shown differences in preferences between men and women 
concerning labour supply when approaching retirement (Been and van Vliet 2014; Belloni and Alessie 
2009); women tend to experience retirement differently (Moen 1996; Quick and Moen 1998; Smith 
and Moen 1998) and often synchronise their career exit with that of their spouse (Quick and Moen 
1998). We also chose to focus on informal care of children, grandchildren and adults, because, for 
women, caring activities are a frequent alternative to regular work, particularly in Mediterranean 
countries, where family ties are very strong, the formal provision of care suffers from rationing 
problems (Brilli et al. 2011) and filling the gaps is considered a moral duty by most women.5 Research 
has shown that the availability of formal (public or market) care affects households’ decisions in 
general and mothers’ labour supply specifically. Particularly important is the role of (grand)mothers, 
as their availability for childcare is positively correlated with the labour force participation and fertility 
of their (grand)daughters (Aparicio-Fenoll and Vidal-Fernandez 2014). In the same vein, Coda 
Moscarola et al. (2016) document the impact of the pension reform on grandmothers’ absenteeism. In 
terms of magnitude, the total amount of unpaid family care in Italy has been estimated to be around 
67.06 billion euros (Bettio et al. 2013), and the majority of women aged 55 and above declare 
themselves to be engaged in it (Coda Moscarola et al. 2016). 
In our sample we observe widespread willingness to anticipate retirement, which is not always 
accompanied by a corresponding desire to pay to take advantage of it. The willingness to anticipate 
retirement is particularly strong for workers who were directly affected by the reform and for women. 
In terms of the desire to pay to anticipate retirement, however, we see practically no difference 
between workers affected and those unaffected by the reform. Informal care duties play a role in 
explaining the willingness to pay, and, interestingly, this role differs across genders. Women who are 
involved in informal care of children (or grandchildren) are willing to pay significantly more than 
women who are not, while no effect of caregiving duties is observed for men. We also check whether 
the respondent’s degree of comprehension of the reform affects his or her willingness to anticipate 
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retirement and readiness to pay for doing so. Interestingly, we find that this variable has almost no 
significant effect on the workers’ reaction to the reform. 
Our findings suggest that it is important to quantify the willingness to pay of individuals who have 
been affected by a reform and not merely to register their desire to return to the previous status quo. 
Moreover, the different impacts on different subgroups of the population suggest that retirement 
policies have important side effects that perhaps should be accounted for and/or neutralised with 
complementary policies. For example, more structured policy interventions for children could alleviate 
the caring burden of relatives, especially women.  
 
Data and sample selection 
In this work we use a data set that was specifically designed to examine the effects of the last Italian 
pension reform on several aspects of older workers’ behaviour. The survey was conducted in July 
2014 by GFK-Eurisko (http://www.gfk.com/it/), a well-known international institute for marketing 
research, opinion polls and socio-economic surveys.6  
The sample concerns employees aged 55 and above and was extracted from two GFK panels (GFK 
“dialogue” and “Toluna”), both statistically representative of the Italian population with respect to the 
principal socio-demographic characteristics, namely: region of residence, gender, age, education, 
occupation and household size. 
The survey asked questions about their working activity, care responsibilities towards children 
(grandchildren) and adults, retirement position and the changes introduced by the pension reform. It 
also investigated their personal understanding of the motivation and effects of the reform and collects 
data on wealth and saving and investing choices. The wealth and saving variables refer to the 
household, not to the individual respondent. Finally, the survey obtained information concerning the 
standard socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent and his or her occupational background 
and health status. In Appendix A we provide a detailed description of the variables used in our 
analysis. 
For our purposes we selected the sub-sample of respondents with a complete record of consistent 
answers. We dropped individuals whose desired age of retirement is greater than the minimum 
retirement age but who claimed to be willing to pay to anticipate retirement (28 observations). We also 
omitted individuals who declared that they had been forced to postpone retirement by more than 7 
years (19 observations). We left out individuals with missing information relative to their desired or 
statutory retirement age (214 observations); this rate of non-response to the question about the 
expected age of retirement is in line with the one observed in the population of employees aged 55 to 
65 in the 2014 Bank of Italy Survey of Households Income and Wealth (SHIW). We also dropped 
from the sample individuals aged 65 and above (10 observations) and individuals who declared their 
willingness to reduce their pension by more than 20 per cent to be able to retire (9 observations). 
Therefore, our final sample consists of 525 observations. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics.7  
[Insert Table 1 approximately here] 
 
Table 1 shows that the expected age of retirement is about 64 for both men and women, while the 
desired age of retirement is 61 for women and 62 for men. The desire to anticipate retirement varies 
according to gender: it involves 77 per cent of women and 70 per cent of men.  
                                                 
6
 Since 2012 GFK-Eurisko has run the well-known Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth for the Bank of 
Italy. 
7
 The descriptive statistics for employees aged 55‒65 in the SHIW data are reported in the Appendix. 
 4
The Monti‒Fornero pension reform directly affected about 65 per cent of the sample (an average of 61 
for women and 68 for men), on average delaying their retirement by about 3.9 years (3.6 for men and 
4.3 for women). More than half (56 per cent of the sample: 58 for men and 53 for women) declared 
themselves to be ready to pay to anticipate retirement.  
Finally, 79 per cent of the women and 69 per cent of the men are involved in informal caring activities 
towards children and/or adults.8  
In terms of socio-demographic variables, the average age of the respondents is 58 years, 60 per cent of 
them are men, a third of them have a university degree and white-collar workers (managers, clerks or 
teachers) represent the large majority. 
  
Results 
In this section we study how the respondents’ characteristics affect their desire to anticipate retirement 
and their readiness to pay for it, and we present the main results of our paper. 
We measured the preference for anticipated retirement as the difference between the expected and the 
desired retirement age. As a proxy for the respondent’s readiness to pay, we used the answer to a 
specific question asking how much he/she was ready to pay to anticipate retirement by one year. 
As an immediate consequence of the reform, some older workers were unexpectedly forced to stay 
longer at work than they had planned under the previous pension rules. As a consequence, we expect 
these workers to experience the largest difference between the expected and the desired retirement age. 
For the same reason, we suppose that they are willing to pay more than younger workers, who were 
not directly affected by the reform, to gain an additional year of retirement under the new rules. The 
readiness to pay to anticipate retirement should also be positively correlated with the cost of staying at 
work. We expect it to be higher for workers with higher salaries, for those involved in informal 
caregiving activities and for those with a poor health status or an arduous job. Finally, we assume that 
workers who are better informed about the effects of the reform may react more clearly to the 
announcement of the new rules in terms of both their willingness to anticipate retirement and their 
readiness to pay for it. 
In Table 2 we report the results of OLS regressions using four different specifications. Column (1) 
presents a model that regresses the gap between the expected and the desired retirement age on 
standard socio-demographic variables, occupational status, involvement in informal caregiving 
activities, a dummy indicating poor health status and a dummy that identifies workers who were 
directly forced to postpone their retirement due to the reform. We see that, with respect to men, 
women declared a significantly larger gap, suggesting a strong gender difference in older workers’ 
preferences regarding work and leisure. Women reported that their gap is approximately 0.8 years 
higher than that of men, and this difference is significant at the 1 per cent level. Interestingly, informal 
caregiving activities, towards either children or adults, do not significantly affect this gap. Being a 
highly qualified worker (manager) unsurprisingly reduces the willingness to anticipate retirement, 
while the opposite is true for workers occupying arduous jobs. We also find that workers who were 
directly affected by the reform declared a higher gap between the expected and the desired time to 
retirement than those who were not directly affected. However, the estimated increase in the 
dependent variable for those who were directly hit by the reform is only about 0.63 years, while the 
average delay in retirement imposed by the reform is 3–4 years (3.6 for men and 4.6 for women). 
[Insert Table 2 approximately here] 
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These results are robust if we control for the level of household wealth, proxied by the self-assessed 
value of the household dwelling9 (column (2)). Columns (3) and (4) present models in which we 
consider the degree of comprehension of the reform as an additional explanatory variable. To measure 
the degree of comprehension of the reform, we check whether the respondent agrees with three 
statements describing the main objectives of the reform (variable “comprehension index 1” in column 
(3)) and whether she can correctly anticipate the effects of the reform on her pension benefits (variable 
“comprehension index 2” in column (4)).10 We find that only the first measure of comprehension 
significantly affects the willingness to anticipate retirement: the less the individual understands the 
scopes underlying the reform, the more she wants to anticipate retirement. However, this effect 
vanishes if we include wealth in the model11 (as in column (4)). Overall, we conclude that the 
willingness to anticipate retirement is affected by the reform insofar as it directly forced the 
respondent to postpone retirement, but the degree of comprehension of the reform does not play a 
significant role. 
Table 3 reports the results of a Tobit model investigating the determinants of the willingness to pay to 
anticipate retirement, measured as a percentage of the pension benefit. Under the first specification 
(column (1)), one can see that only the expected age of retirement and being involved in informal care 
of children/grandchildren significantly increase the willingness to pay, and this latter effect is true only 
for women. An increase of one year in the expected age of retirement induces the respondent to give 
up 0.37 percentage points of his or her pension to anticipate retirement, and this effect is significant at 
the 1 per cent level. Women who take care of children are on average ready to renounce up to 3.7 
percentage points of their pension to anticipate retirement. This effect is economically stronger than 
the previous one but statistically less significant. All the other socio-demographic variables as well as 
the occupational status do not produce significant effects. The fact of having been directly affected by 
the reform now does not produce a significant effect on the worker’s readiness to pay to anticipate 
retirement. This is in sharp contrast to the findings in Table 2, especially for women, since they 
declared a larger gap between the expected and the desired retirement age. Many workers who have 
been constrained to work longer following the reform desire to retire early, but, on average, they are 
not willing to renounce any part of their pension benefit to do so. 
[Insert Table 3 approximately here] 
 
In column (2) we also consider wealth as an explanatory variable. We find that the level of wealth 
positively affects the readiness to pay. Again, informal caregiving activity has a significant effect but 
only for women. On average, women in charge of childcare are willing to renounce up to 4.1 
percentage points of their pension to anticipate retirement. Informal care of adults, instead, does not 
produce any significant effect either for men or for women.  
Finally, referring to columns (3) and (4), we test whether the degree of comprehension of the reform 
affects the willingness to pay. Regarding the willingness to anticipate retirement (as in Table 2), we do 
not observe any significant effect of this variable.  
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Conclusions 
In this paper we study the effect of the last reform of the Italian pension system, the so-called “Monti–
Fornero” reform introduced in December 2011, on two aspects of older workers’ behaviour: their 
willingness to anticipate retirement and to pay for doing so. The reform introduced sharp restrictions 
on early retirement and more stringent age and seniority requirements for standard retirement. It was 
implemented almost without delay due to the Italian financial emergency conditions and thus produced 
a large policy shock. 
Using a data set drawn from a representative sample of Italian workers aged 55 and older, we find 
different reactions concerning, respectively, the willingness to anticipate retirement and the possibility 
to pay for it. While women and workers who were directly affected by the reform show a strong 
willingness to anticipate retirement, the inclination to pay does not seem to differ across workers who 
were directly hit by the reform and those who were not. However, informal care duties towards 
children play a role in explaining the willingness to pay, and interestingly this role differs across 
genders. Women who are involved in informal care of children are willing to pay significantly more 
than women who are not (as well as men).  
Our findings suggest that workers consider retirement rules as unalterable “entitlements” and therefore 
neglect the collective cost of early retirement. This effect is perhaps a legacy of the rather generous 
Defined Benefit formulae. Only women involved in childcare are willing to pay to “buy more time” to 
devote to (grand-)children. This could imply that matching policies offering high-quality care services 
to children or grandchildren would also increase the acceptance of the pension reforms among the 
population. Such policies would be particularly appropriate in countries, like Italy, where pensions 
constitute a very large share of the social expenditure while few resources are addressed to childcare 
services and grandparents are often asked to compensate for the shortcomings of the child-care system. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics of the sample 
 Variables Obs. Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. 
Women Age 210 57.7 2.4 55.0 64.0 
 Couple 210 78% 0.4 0.0 1.0 
 North 210 45% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Centre 210 30% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 University degree 210 36% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 High school diploma 210 53% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Manager 210 11% 0.3 0.0 1.0 
 White collar 210 70% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Caregiving 210 79% 0.4 0.0 1.0 
 Caregiving children 210 58% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Caregiving elderly 210 71% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Arduous work 210 44% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Poor health 210 5% 0.2 0.0 1.0 
 Expected age of retirement 210 64.4 2.7 58.0 75.0 
 Desired age of retirement 210 60.9 2.6 55.0 70.0 
 Wants to anticipate retirement 210 77% 0.4 0.0 1.0 
 Desired number of years of anticipation 210 3.5 2.9 -3.0 15.0 
 Willingness to pay to anticipate retirement (% of sample) 210 53% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Willingness to pay to anticipate retirement as % of pension 210 4.0 5.6 0.0 20.0 
 Treated by Monti–Fornero reform 210 61% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Delay in retirement imposed by Monti–Fornero if treated 129 4.3 1.9 1.0 7.0 
 Comprehension index 1 210 9.6 3.7 3 18 
 Comprehension index 2 210 54% 0.5 0 1 
Men Age 315 58.2 2.7 55.0 65.0 
 Couple 315 90% 0.3 0.0 1.0 
 North 315 36% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Centre 315 26% 0.4 0.0 1.0 
 University degree 315 33% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 High school diploma 315 48% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Manager 315 21% 0.4 0.0 1.0 
 White collar 315 53% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Caregiving 315 69% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Caregiving children 315 52% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Caregiving elderly 315 57% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Arduous work 315 33% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Poor health 315 3% 0.2 0.0 1.0 
 Expected age of retirement 315 64.5 3.2 55.0 75.0 
 Desired age of retirement 315 62.1 3.0 55.0 70.0 
 Wants to anticipate retirement 315 70% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Desired number of years of anticipation 315 2.4 2.9 -7.0 15.0 
 Willingness to pay to anticipate retirement (% of sample) 315 58% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Willingness to pay to anticipate retirement as % of pension 315 3.3 4.9 0.0 20.0 
 Treated by Monti–Fornero reform 315 68% 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Delay in retirement imposed by Monti–Fornero if treated 213 3.6 1.6 1.0 7.0 
 Comprehension index 1 315 9.3 3.4 3 18 
 Comprehension index 2 315 52% 0.5 0 1 
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Table 2 – OLS – Dependent variable: difference between the expected age of retirement and the desired 
age of retirement 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 b/se b/se b/se    b/se    
Age  -0.428*** -0.424*** -0.426*** -0.425*** 
 (0.037) (0.047) (0.037) (0.047)    
Man  -0.872*** -0.919*** -0.851*** -0.907*** 
 (0.203) (0.238) (0.203) (0.241)    
Couple  0.140 0.505 0.131 0.467    
 (0.284) (0.335) (0.280) (0.333)    
North  -0.144 -0.348 -0.144 -0.353    
 (0.231) (0.255) (0.233) (0.255)    
Centre  -0.134 -0.145 -0.116 -0.139    
 (0.259) (0.329) (0.260) (0.328)    
University degree  0.013 0.111 0.082 0.209    
 (0.389) (0.524) (0.394) (0.529)    
High school degree 0.364 0.518 0.417 0.596    
 (0.338) (0.455) (0.343) (0.458)    
Manager  -0.706** -0.647 -0.671* -0.609    
 (0.342) (0.406) (0.342) (0.406)    
White collar  -0.217 -0.142 -0.290 -0.208    
 (0.269) (0.342) (0.271) (0.348)    
Caregiving children -0.248 -0.250 -0.218 -0.224    
 (0.213) (0.247) (0.214) (0.248)    
Caregiving elderly 0.125 0.057 0.137 0.102    
 (0.225) (0.265) (0.223) (0.262)    
Poor health status  0.340 0.340 0.337 0.351    
 (0.394) (0.494) (0.388) (0.493)    
Expected age of retirement  0.580*** 0.556*** 0.578*** 0.551*** 
 (0.041) (0.053) (0.041) (0.053)    
Arduous work 0.497** 0.500** 0.502** 0.517**  
 (0.211) (0.239) (0.212) (0.243)    
Treated 0.631*** 0.562** 0.545** 0.527**  
 (0.208) (0.242) (0.212) (0.256)    
Housing wealth  -0.000  -0.000    
  (0.001)  (0.001)    
Comprehension index 1   0.066** 0.055    
   (0.028) (0.034)    
Comprehension index 2   0.133 -0.069    
   (0.194) (0.233)    
Constant -9.750*** -8.597*** -10.388*** -8.754*** 
 (2.577) (3.124) (2.599) (3.161)    
     
R-squared 0.460 0.450 0.465 0.451    
N 525 362 525 362   
Note: Significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses. Omitted dummies: female, single, 
south, blue collar, good health status. “Treated” stands for: “obliged to postpone retirement because of the Monti–Fornero 
reform”. “Comprehension index 1” is lower for those individuals who agreed with three statements describing the main 
objectives of the reform. “Comprehension index 2” is equal to one if the individual could correctly anticipate the effects of the 
reform on her pension benefits. 
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Table 3 – Tobit – Dependent variable: amount of pension the individual is willing to renounce to 
anticipate retirement 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)    
 b/se b/se b/se b/se    
Age 0.008 -0.099 0.011 -0.093    
 (0.150) (0.173) (0.150) (0.173)    
Man  0.941 2.926* 0.883 2.884*   
 (1.501) (1.698) (1.504) (1.718)    
Couple  1.134 1.560 1.186 1.590    
 (1.183) (1.729) (1.186) (1.717)    
North  1.417 1.238 1.386 1.249    
 (0.943) (1.047) (0.944) (1.050)    
Centre  -0.062 0.563 -0.118 0.574    
 (0.980) (1.088) (0.982) (1.093)    
University degree  1.709 2.374 1.633 2.303    
 (1.548) (1.811) (1.543) (1.801)    
High school degree 0.405 0.513 0.387 0.463    
 (1.375) (1.634) (1.375) (1.638)    
Manager  0.731 0.278 0.515 0.093    
 (1.426) (1.628) (1.446) (1.670)    
White collar  -0.036 -0.435 -0.033 -0.515    
 (1.172) (1.380) (1.170) (1.381)    
Caregiving children*men 0.150 -1.063 0.096 -1.120    
 (0.991) (1.122) (0.993) (1.120)    
Caregiving children*women 3.704** 4.146** 3.635** 4.139**  
 (1.478) (1.651) (1.472) (1.643)    
Caregiving elderly*men 0.212 -0.041 0.201 -0.067    
 (1.015) (1.137) (1.013) (1.129)    
Caregiving elderly*women -0.937 0.484 -0.981 0.402    
 (1.607) (1.795) (1.605) (1.798)    
Poor health status 0.475 0.942 0.420 0.876    
 (2.444) (2.449) (2.413) (2.424)    
Expected age of retirement 0.373*** 0.467*** 0.384*** 0.481*** 
 (0.141) (0.164) (0.141) (0.166)    
Arduous work 0.987 2.126** 0.968 2.146**  
 (0.827) (0.940) (0.826) (0.943)    
Treated -0.002 -0.473 0.008 -0.567    
 (0.824) (0.941) (0.855) (0.975)    
Housing wealth  0.007**  0.007**  
  (0.003)  (0.003)    
Comprehension index 1   -0.097 -0.031    
   (0.118) (0.130)    
Comprehension index 2   0.471 0.702    
   (0.791) (0.894)    
Constant -27.687** -30.544** -27.776** -31.632**  
 (11.450) (12.894) (11.475) (13.102)    
Sigma                    
_constant 7.851*** 7.241*** 7.849*** 7.238*** 
 (0.382) (0.409) (0.383) (0.409)    
                    
N 525 362 525 362  
Note: Significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses. Omitted dummies: female, single, 
south, blue collar, good health status. “Treated” stands for: “obliged to postpone retirement because of the Monti–Fornero 
reform”. “Comprehension index 1” is lower for those individuals who agreed with three statements describing the main 
objectives of the reform. “Comprehension index 2” is equal to one if the individual could correctly anticipate the effects of the 
reform on her pension benefits.  
 11
Appendix: The Eurisko questionnaire 
In October 2014 CeRP-Collegio Carlo Alberto commissioned Eurisko-GFK to conduct a survey on a 
representative sample of Italian dependent workers aged 55 and above. The participants were interviewed 
about many aspects of their working position, their contribution patterns to the social security schemes, 
their comprehension and knowledge of the aims and scopes of the pension reform that occurred in Italy at 
the end of 2011, their saving and investment decisions, their health status and their informal caregiving 
activities. Here follows a list of the sections into which the survey was organised and a detailed 
description of the questions of the survey used in the empirical analysis of this paper. 
 
A Socio-demographic information 
A1: Age 
A2: Occupational status 
A3: Sex 
A4: Education 
A5: Marital status 
A6: Region of residence 
B Occupational status and pension scheme 
B1: What is your pension scheme? 
B2: What is your seniority in the pension scheme? 
B3: What is your desired age of retirement? 
B4: According to the current rules, when do you expect to retire? 
B6: To access retirement one year before the expected retirement age, what percentage of pension 
benefit are you willing to renounce? 
C Expectations and perceptions about the aims and scopes of the social security system 
D Expectations and perceptions about the social security reform that occurred in 2011 (the so-
called Monti–Fornero reform) 
D1: How much do you agree with the statements below: 
(very much, much, so and so, not much, not at all, I do not know) 
The objective of the Monti–Fornero reform is:  
- To contrast the effects of population ageing on public finances  
- To convince the financial markets that the Italian pension system does not threaten the 
sustainability of the public debt 
- To improve the equilibrium of the pension system also for the young and the future 
generations 
D3: As a consequence of the Monti–Fornero reform, has your retirement been delayed? 
D4: By how many years? (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, more than 5 (specify)…) 
D8: As a consequence of an increase in the retirement age and of the introduction of the NDC 
pension rule (Monti–Fornero reform), do you expect an increase, a reduction or no effect on your 
pension benefit? 
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D9: What change in the amount of pension benefit do you expect as a consequence of the increase 
in the age of retirement and of the adoption of the notional defined contribution rule from 2012? 
(an increase, a decrease, no variation, I do not know) 
E Household savings and wealth 
E1: In your opinion, how much would you receive if you sold your house today?  
F Health status and informal caregiving duties 
F1: Would you say your health is excellent/very good/good/fair/poor? 
F5: Do you think your work is arduous? 
F6: How often altogether have you given personal care or practical household help to an elderly 
family member? (0 hours, 1–10 hours, 11–30 hours, 31 hours or more) 
F7: How often altogether have you given personal care or practical household help to a young 
family member (child or grandchild)? (0 hours, 1–10 hours, 11–30 hours, 31 hours or more) 
 
 
 
Comparison with the Bank of Italy sample 2014 
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics – BI-SHIW 2014 sample of employees aged 55–65 
Variables Obs. Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. 
Women      
Age 488 58.35 2.56 55 65 
Couple 488 0.72 0.45 0 1 
North 488 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Centre 488 0.22 0.41 0 1 
University degree 488 0.27 0.45 0 1 
High school diploma 488 0.43 0.50 0 1 
      
Men      
Age 668 58.69 2.86 55 65 
Couple 668 0.83 0.38 0 1 
North 668 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Centre 668 0.19 0.39 0 1 
University degree 668 0.21 0.41 0 1 
High school diploma 668 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Note: sample of waged employees aged 55–65. 
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